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Abstract. A mediator implements a correlated equilibrium when it pro-
poses a strategy to each player confidentially such that the mediator’s
proposal is the best interest for every player to follow. In this paper,
we present a mediator that implements the best correlated equilibrium
for an extended El Farol game with symmetric players. The extended El
Farol game we consider incorporates both negative and positive network
effects.
We study the degree to which this type of mediator can decrease the
overall social cost. In particular, we give an exact characterization of Me-
diation Value (MV ) and Enforcement Value (EV ) for this game. MV is
the ratio of the minimum social cost over all Nash equilibria to the min-
imum social cost over all mediators of this type, and EV is the ratio of
the minimum social cost over all mediators of this type to the optimal
social cost. This sort of exact characterization is uncommon for games
with both kinds of network effects. An interesting outcome of our results
is that both the MV and EV values can be unbounded for our game.
Keywords: Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, Mediators and Net-
work Effects.
1 Introduction
When players act selfishly to minimize their own costs, the outcome with respect
to the total social cost may be poor. The Price of Anarchy [21] measures the
impact of selfishness on the social cost and is defined as the ratio of the worst
social cost over all Nash equilibria to the optimal social cost. In a game, with
a high Price of Anarchy, one way to reduce social cost is to find a mediator of
expected social cost less than the social cost of any Nash equilibrium.
In the literature, there are several types of mediators [4, 15, 18, 19, 23, 27–30,
32]. In this paper, we consider only the type of mediator that implements a
correlated equilibrium (CE) [7].
A mediator is a trusted external party that suggests a strategy to every
player separately and privately so that each player has no gain to choose another
strategy assuming that the other players conform to the mediator’s suggestion.
? A full version with all the proofs is available at the authors’ homepages.
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The algorithm that the mediator uses is known to all players. However, the
mediator’s random bits are unknown. We assume that the players are symmetric
in the sense that they have the same utility function and the probability the
mediator suggests a strategy to some player is independent of the identity of
that player.
Ashlagi et al. [5] define two metrics to measure the quality of a mediator:
the mediation value (MV ) and the enforcement value (EV ). In our paper, we
compute these values, adapted for games where players seek to minimize the
social cost. The Mediation Value is defined as the ratio of the minimum social
cost over all Nash equilibria to the minimum social cost over all mediators. The
Enforcement Value is the ratio of the minimum social cost over all mediators to
the optimal social cost.
A mediator is optimal when its expected social cost is minimum over all me-
diators. Thus, the Mediation Value measures the quality of the optimal mediator
with respect to the best Nash equilibrium; and the Enforcement Value measures
the quality of the optimal mediator with respect to the optimal social cost.
1.1 El Farol Game
First we describe the traditional El Farol game [3, 14, 12, 22]. El Farol is a tapas
bar in Santa Fe. Every Friday night, a population of people decide whether or
not to go to the bar. If too many people go, they will all have a worse time
than if they stayed home, since the bar will be too crowded. That is a negative
network effect [16].
Now we provide an extension of the traditional El Farol game, where both
negative and positive network effects [16] are considered. The positive network
effect is that if too few people go, those that go will also have a worse time than
if they stayed home.
Motivation. Our motivation for studying this problem comes from the following
discussion in [16].
“It’s important to keep in mind, of course, that many real situations in fact dis-
play both kinds of [positive and negative] externalities - some level of participation
by others is good, but too much is bad. For example, the El Farol Bar might be
most enjoyable if a reasonable crowd shows up, provided it does not exceed 60.
Similarly, an on-line social media site with limited infrastructure might be most
enjoyable if it has a reasonably large audience, but not so large that connecting
to the Web site becomes very slow due to the congestion.”
We note that our El Farol extension is one of the simplest, non-trivial prob-
lems for which a mediator can improve the social cost. Thus, it is useful for
studying the power of a mediation.
Formal Definition of the Extended El Farol Game. We now formally
define our game, which is non-atomic [8, 31], in the sense that no individual player
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Fig. 1. The individual cost to go f(x).
has significant influence on the outcome; moreover, the number of players is very
large tending to infinity. The (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game has three parameters c, s1
and s2, where 0 < c < s1 and s2 > 0. If x is the fraction of players to go, then
the cost f(x) for any player to go is as follows:
f(x) =
{
c− s1x 0 ≤ x ≤ cs1 ,
s2(x− cs1 ) cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
(1)
and the cost to stay is 1. The function f(x) is illustrated in the two plots of
Figure 1.
Our Contributions. The main contributions of our paper are threefold:
– We design an optimal mediator, which implements the best correlated equi-
librium for an extension of the El Farol game with symmetric players. No-
tably, this extension incorporates both negative and positive network effects.
– We give an exact characterization of the Mediation Value (MV ) and the
Enforcement Value (EV ) for our game.
– We show that both the MV and EV values can be unbounded for our game.
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we discuss the related work. Section 3 states
the definitions and notations that we use in the El Farol game. Our results are
given in Section 4, where we show our main theorem that characterizes the best
correlated equilibrium, and we compute accordingly the Mediation Value and
the Enforcement Value. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses
some open problems.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Mediation Metrics
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [13] analyze the price of anarchy and the price
of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria in linear congestion games. A
consequence of their results is that the EV for these games is at least 1.577 and
at most 1.6, and the MV is at most 1.015.
Brandt et al. [10] compute the mediation value and the enforcement value
in ranking games. In a ranking game, every outcome is a ranking of the players,
and each player strictly prefers high ranks over lower ones [11]. They show that
for the ranking games with n > 2 players, EV = n − 1. They also show that
MV = n − 1 for n > 3 players, and for n = 3 players where at least one player
has more than two actions.
The authors of [15] design a mediator that implements a correlated equilib-
rium for a virus inoculation game [6, 24]. In this game, there are n players, each
corresponding to a node in a square grid. Every player has either to inoculate
itself (at a cost of 1) or to do nothing and risk infection, which costs L > 1. After
each node decides to inoculate or not, one node in the grid selected uniformly
at random is infected with a virus. Any node, v, that chooses not to inoculate
becomes infected if there is a path from the randomly selected node to v that
traverses only uninoculated nodes. A consequence of their result is that EV is
Θ(1) and MV is Θ((n/L)1/3) for this game.
Jiang et al. [20] analyze the price of miscoordination (PoM) and the price
of sequential commitment (PoSC) in security games, which are defined to be
a certain subclass of Stackelberg games. A consequence of their results is that
MV is unbounded in general security games and it is at least 4/3 and at most
e
e−1 ≈ 1.582 in a certain subclass of security games.
We note that a poorly designed mediator can make the social cost worse than
what is obtained from the Nash equilibria. Bradonjic et al. [9] describe the Price
of Mediation (PoM) which is the ratio of the social cost of the worst correlated
equilibrium to the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium. They show that
for a simple game with two players and two possible strategies, PoM can be as
large as 2. Also, they show for games with more players or more strategies per
player that PoM can be unbounded.
2.2 Finding and Simulating a Mediator
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [26] develop polynomial time algorithms for
finding correlated equilibria in a broad class of succinctly representable multi-
player games. Unfortunately, their results do not extend to non-atomic games;
moreover, they do not allow for direct computation of MV and EV, even when
they can find the best correlated equilibrium.
Abraham et al. [1, 2] describe a distributed algorithm that enables a group of
players to simulate a mediator. This algorithm works robustly with up to linear
size coalitions, and up to a constant fraction of adversarial players. The result
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suggests that the concept of mediation can be useful even in the absence of a
trusted external party.
2.3 Other Types of Mediators
In all equilibria above, the mediator does not act on behalf of the players. How-
ever, a more powerful type of mediators is described in [4, 18, 19, 23, 27–30, 32],
where a mediator can act on behalf of the players that give that right to it.
For multistage games, the notion of the correlated equilibrium is generalized
to the communication equilibrium in [17, 25]. In a communication equilibrium,
the mediator implements a multistage correlated equilibrium; in addition, it
communicates with the players privately to receive their reports at every stage
and selects the recommended strategy to each player accordingly.
3 Definitions and Notations
Now we state the definitions and notations that we use in the El Farol game.
Definition 1. A configuration C(x) characterizes that a fraction of players, x,
is being advised to go; and the remaining fraction of players, (1 − x), is being
advised to stay.
Definition 2. A configuration distribution D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)} is a
probability distribution over k ≥ 2 configurations, where (C(xi), pi) represents
that configuration C(xi) is selected with probability pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Note that
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 < pi < 1,
∑k
i=1 pi = 1 and if xi = xj then i = j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k.
For any player i, let E iG be the event that player i is advised to go, and CiG
be the cost for player i to go (when all other players conform to the advice).
Also let E iS be the event that player i is advised to stay, and CiS be the cost for
player i to stay. Since the players are symmetric, we will omit the index i.
A configuration distribution, D{(C(x1), p1), .., (C(xk), pk)}, is a correlated
equilibrium iff
E [CS |EG] ≥ E [CG|EG],
E [CG|ES ] ≥ E [CS |ES ].
Definition 3. A mediator is a trusted external party that uses a configuration
distribution to advise the players such that this configuration distribution is a
correlated equilibrium. The set of configurations and the probability distribution
are known to all players. The mediator selects a configuration according to the
probability distribution. The advice the mediator sends to a particular player,
based on the selected configuration, is known only to that player.
Throughout the paper, we let n be the number of players.
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4 Our Results
In our results, we assume that the cost to stay is 1; we justify this assumption
at the end of this section. Our first results in Lemmas 1 and 2 are descriptions
of the optimal social cost and the minimum social cost over all Nash equilibria
for our extended El Farol game. We next state our main theorem which charac-
terizes the best correlated equilibrium and determines the Mediation Value and
Enforcement Value.
Lemma 1. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, the optimal social cost is (y
∗f(y∗)+
(1− y∗))n, where
y∗ =

1
2 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) if
c
s1
≤ 12 ( cs1 + 1s2 ) ≤ 1,
c
s1
if 1s2 <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
Proof. By Equation (1), f(x) has two cases. Let f1(x) be f(x) for x ∈ [0, cs1 ],
and let f2(x) be f(x) for x ∈ [ cs1 , 1]. Also let h1(x) be the social cost when
0 ≤ x ≤ cs1 , and let h2(x) be the social cost when cs1 ≤ x ≤ 1. Thus, h1(x) =
(xf1(x) + (1− x))n and h2(x) = (xf2(x) + (1− x))n.
We know that h1(x) is minimized at x =
c
s1
. In addition, we know that h2(x)
is a quadratic function with respect to x, and thus it has one minimum over
x ∈ [ cs1 , 1] at x = y∗, where:
y∗ =

1
2 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) if
c
s1
≤ 12 ( cs1 + 1s2 ) ≤ 1,
c
s1
if 12 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
Let h∗ be the optimal social cost. Then h∗ = min(h1( cs1 ), h2(y
∗)). Since
f1(
c
s1
) = f2(
c
s1
), we have h1(
c
s1
) = h2(
c
s1
). Hence, h∗ = min(h2( cs1 ), h2(y
∗)).
This implies that h∗ = h2(y∗). uunionsq
Lemma 2. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if f(1) ≥ 1, then the best Nash
equilibrium is at which the cost to go in expectation is equal to the cost to stay;
otherwise, the best Nash equilibrium is at which all players would rather go. The
social cost of the best Nash equilibrium is min(n, f(1) · n).
Proof. There are two cases for f(1) to determine the best Nash equilibrium.
Case 1: f(1) ≥ 1. Let Ny be a Nash equilibrium with the minimum social cost
over all Nash equilibria and with a y-fraction of players that go in expectation. If
f(y) > 1, then at least one player of the y-fraction of players would rather stay.
Also if f(y) < 1, then at least one player of the (1− y)-fraction of players would
rather go. Thus, we must have f(y) = 1. Assume that each player has a mixed
strategy, where player i goes with probability yi. Recall that Ny has a y-fraction
of players that go in expectation. Thus, y = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi. Then the social cost is∑n
i=1(yif(y) + (1− yi)), or equivalently, n.
Case 2: f(1) < 1. In this case, the best Nash equilibrium is at which all players
would rather go, with a social cost of f(1) · n.
Therefore, the social cost of the best Nash equilibrium is min(n, f(1) ·n). uunionsq
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Theorem 1. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game , if c ≤ 1, then the best correlated
equilibrium is the best Nash equilibrium; otherwise, the best correlated equilibrium
is D{(C(0), p), (C(x∗), 1− p)}, where λ(c, s1, s2) = c( 1s1 + 1s2 )−
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
,
x∗ =

λ(c, s1, s2) if
c
s1
≤ λ(c, s1, s2) < 1,
c
s1
if λ(c, s1, s2) <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
and p = (1−x
∗)(1−f(x∗))
(1−x∗)(1−f(x∗))+c−1 . Moreover,
1) the expected social cost is (p+ (1− p)(x∗f(x∗) + (1− x∗)))n,
2) the Mediation Value (MV) is min(f(1),1)p+(1−p)(x∗f(x∗)+(1−x∗)) and
3) the Enforcement Value (EV) is p+(1−p)(x
∗f(x∗)+(1−x∗))
y∗f(y∗)+(1−y∗) , where
y∗ =

1
2 (
c
s1
+ 1s2 ) if
c
s1
≤ 12 ( cs1 + 1s2 ) ≤ 1,
c
s1
if 1s2 <
c
s1
,
1 otherwise.
.
Due to the space constraints, the proof of this theorem is not given here.
The following corollary shows that for c > 1, if λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, then the best
correlated equilibrium is the best Nash equilibrium, where all players would
rather go.
Corollary 1. For any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if c > 1 and λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1
then MV = 1.
Proof. By Theorem 1, when λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, x∗ = 1 and p = 0. Now we
prove that if λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, then the best correlated equilibrium is the best
Nash equilibrium of the case f(1) < 1 in Lemma 2. To do so, we prove that
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1⇒ f(1) < 1.
Now assume by way of contradiction that λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1⇒ f(1) ≥ 1. Recall
that f(1) = s2(1 − cs1 ). Then λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1 ⇒ cs1 + 1s2 ≤ 1, or equivalently,
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1 ⇒ cs1 + 1s2 ≤ λ(c, s1, s2). Also recall that λ(c, s1, s2) = c( 1s1 +
1
s2
)−
√
c( 1s1
+ 1s2
)(c−1)
s2
. Thus, we have:
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1 ⇒ c
s1
+
1
s2
≤ c( 1
s1
+
1
s2
)−
√
c( 1s1 +
1
s2
)(c− 1)
s2
⇒ s2 · c
s1
≤ −1,
which contradicts since s1, s2 and c are all positive. Therefore, for c > 1 and
λ(c, s1, s2) ≥ 1, MV must be equal to 1. uunionsq
Now we show that MV and EV can be unbounded in the following corollaries.
8 D. Mitsche, G. Saad and J. Saia
Corollary 2. For any (2 + , 2+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as → 0, MV→∞.
Proof. For any (2 + , 2+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, we have f(1) = 1. By Theorem 1,
we obtain x∗ = 1− , f(x∗) = 0 and p = 1+2 for  ≤ 12 (
√
3− 1). Thus we have
lim
→0
MV = lim
→0
min (f(1), 1)

1+2 + (
1+
1+2 )
=∞.
uunionsq
Corollary 3. For any (1 + , 1+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as → 0, EV→∞.
Proof. For any (1 + , 1+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, by Theorem 1, we obtain x
∗ =
1 + 2 − √1 + 2 and f(x∗) = 1 + −√1− 2. Then we have
p =
(1− (1 + 2 − √1 + 2))(1− (1 + −√1− 2))
(1− (1 + 2 − √1 + 2))(1− (1 + −√1− 2)) +  .
Also we have y∗ = 1−  and f(y∗) = 0 for  ≤ 12 . Thus we have
lim
→0
EV = lim
→0
p+ (1− p)(x∗f(x∗) + (1− x∗))
y∗f(y∗) + (1− y∗) =∞.
uunionsq
Fig. 2. NE, MED, OPT, MV and EV with respect to s1 and s2.
Based on these results, we show in Figures 2 and 3 the social cost of the best
Nash equilibrium (NE), the expected social cost of our optimal mediator (MED)
and the optimal social cost (OPT), normalized by n, with respect to s1, s2 and
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Fig. 3. NE, MED, OPT, MV and EV with respect to c/s1.
c/s1. Also we show the corresponding Mediation Value (MV ) and Enforcement
Value (EV ).
In Figure 2, the left plot shows that for c = 2 and s2 = 10, the values of NE,
MED, OPT increase, each up to a certain point, when s1 increases; however,
the values of MV and EV decrease when s1 increases. Moreover, MV reaches
its peak at the point where the best Nash equilibrium starts to remain constant
with respect to s1. In the right plot, we set c = 2 and s1 = 2.25; it shows that
the values of NE, MED, OPT, MV and EV increase, each up to a certain point,
when s2 increases.
Figure 3 illustrates Corollaries 2 and 3, and it shows how fast MV and EV go
to infinity with respect to c/s1, where c/s1 = 1− . The left plot shows that for
any (2 + , 2+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as c/s1 → 1 (→ 0), MV →∞ and EV → 2.
In the right plot, for any (1 + , 1+1− ,
1
 )-El Farol game, as c/s1 → 1 ( → 0),
EV →∞ and MV → 2.
Note that for any (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, if c/s1 = 1, then the best corre-
lated equilibrium is at which all players would rather go with a social cost of 0,
that is the best Nash equilibrium as well. Therefore, once c/s1 is equal to 1, MV
drops to 1.
The cost to stay assumption
Now we justify our assumption that the cost to stay is unity. Let (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El
Farol game be a variant of (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game, where 0 < c
′ < s′1, s
′ > 0
and the cost to stay is t′ > 0. If x is the fraction of players to go, then the cost
f ′(x) for any player to go is as follows:
f ′(x) =
{
c′ − s′1x 0 ≤ x ≤ c
′
s′1
,
s′2(x− c
′
s′1
) c
′
s′1
≤ x ≤ 1.
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The following lemma shows that any (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El Farol game can be reduced
to a (c, s1, s2)-El Farol game.
Lemma 3. Any (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El Farol game can be reduced to a (c, s1, s2)-El
Farol game that has the same Mediation Value and Enforcement Value, where
c = c
′
t′ , s1 =
s′1
t′ and s2 =
s′2
t′ .
Proof. In a manner similar to Theorem (1), for any (c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′)-El Farol game,
if c > t′, then the best correlated equilibrium is D{(C(0), p′), (C(x′), 1 − p′)},
where λ′(c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′) = c′( 1s′1 +
1
s′2
)−
√
c′( 1
s′1
+ 1
s′2
)(c′−t′)
s′2
;
x′ =

λ′(c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′) if c
′
s′1
≤ λ′(c′, s′1, s′2, t′) < 1,
c′
s′1
if λ′(c′, s′1, s
′
2, t
′) < c
′
s′1
,
1 otherwise.
and p′ = (1−x
′)(t′−f(x′))
(1−x′)(t′−f(x′))+c′−t′ . Moreover,
1) the Mediation Value (MV ′) is min (f
′(1),t′)
p′t′+(1−p′)(x′f(x′)+(1−x′)t′) and
2) the Enforcement Value (EV ′) is p
′t′+(1−p′)(x′f(x′)+(1−x′)t′)
y′f(y′)+(1−y′)t′ , where
y′ =

1
2 (
c′
s′1
+ t
′
s′2
) if c
′
s′1
≤ 12 ( c
′
s′1
+ t
′
s′2
) ≤ 1,
c′
s′1
if t
′
s′2
< c
′
s′1
,
1 otherwise.
.
Similarly, for c ≤ t′, we have MV ′ = 1 and EV ′ = min (f ′(1),t′)y′f(y′)+(1−y′)t′ .
For both cases, by Theorem 1, if we set c = c′/t′, s1 = s′1/t
′ and s2 =
s′2/t
′, then we have f ′(1) = f(1) · t′; also we get y′ = y∗ and λ′(c′, s′1, s′2, t′) =
λ(c, s1, s2). This implies that f
′(y′) = f(y∗) · t′ and x′ = x∗; which in turn
f ′(x′) = f(x∗) · t′ and p′ = p. Thus, we obtain MV ′ = MV and EV ′ = EV . uunionsq
5 Conclusion
We have extended the traditional El Farol game to have both negative and
positive network effects. We have described an optimal mediator, and we have
measured the Mediation Value and the Enforcement Value to completely char-
acterize the benefit of our mediator with respect to the best Nash equilibrium
and the optimal social cost.
Several open questions remain including the following: can we generalize our
results for our game where the players choose among k > 2 actions? How many
configurations are required to design an optimal mediator when there are k > 2
actions? Another problem is characterizing the MV and EV values for our game
with the more powerful mediators in [4, 18, 19, 23, 27–30, 32]. How much would
these more powerful mediators reduce the social cost over our type of weaker
mediator?
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